This paper examines the role that social networks play in the adoption process of Bacillus thurigiensis (Bt) cotton, a type of genetically engineered cotton that has been available on the Indian market since 2002. Using a unique dataset and empirical methodology, I find that farmers appeared to have exclusively learned from the experimentation of a small set of "progressive" farmers in the village, that is, adoption by other ("regular") farmers was not considered a useful source of information about the technology. Second, I find evidence of social pressures, originating from the belief that Bt cotton might be hazardous to the environment and livestock, which inhibited adoption, at least for some time.
New agricultural technologies in developing countries have the potential to significantly increase agricultural incomes and living standards, thereby transforming rural economies. However, when these technologies are introduced, adoption often does not occur immediately. Farmers instead appear to follow a complex pattern of gradual adoption, dis-adoption, and often non-adoption (Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985; Besley and Case 1993; Sunding and Zilberman 2001) .
What determines the pattern of adoption? The literature has emphasized the role of prices, attributes of the individual (such as income, risk-aversion, education, etc.), and attributes of the technology as being important predictors of adoption behavior (see Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985 for an overview). However, as Griliches (1957) and Rogers (1962 Rogers ( , 1995 note, these technological attributes need to be known by the farmer in order to influence his behavior. In the absence of such information, a certain amount of experimentation is required on the part of the farmer before he can establish the profitability of the new technology. By itself, this poses a constraint to adoption. More recently, the literature on technology adoption has emphasized the importance of social learning, whereby farmers learn from the experimentation of others (see Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2010; McNiven and Gilligan 2012) . Whether, and at what rate, such diffusion increases adoption depends on (a) the incentive of individuals to strategically delay adoption (and free-ride on the experimentation of others), and (b) the structure of the social network.
The recent literature on technology adoption has indeed found evidence of strategic delaying behavior (see Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Bandiera and Rasul 2006) . 1 We know relatively little, however, about how the structure of social networks influences adoption. If social relationships are structured such that everyone learns from a few key figures, the outcome may be perverse: the inherent stochasticity of returns, combined with experimentation by a select few (whom the others in the village are dependent on for information), may result in little to no adoption (this insight is formalized in Bala and Goyal 1998) .
While experimentation by an individual farmer creates externalities through the social learning process, there is an additional, distinct source of externality that arises from the nature of new agricultural technologies. The introduction of new Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is responsible for a large share of the technological progress in agriculture. There is a lively debate on genetically modified (GM) technologies in Europe and much of the developing world. While new technologies might be generally viewed with suspicion, GM technologies are, in addition, often (correctly or incorrectly) associated with harmful externalities (in terms of consumers' and farmers' health and the environment). For a discussion on GM technologies in India, see Herring (2008) . Where new technologies are identified to have negative externalities, social pressures may inhibit the adoption process (Rogers 1962; Appadurai 1989; Vasavi 1994; Moser and Barrett 2006) . By inhibiting adoption (and hence experimentation), these pressures can also reduce the amount of information generated about the technology. Using a unique household-level dataset I collected for this purpose in three villages in rural India, this paper studies the adoption process of Bacillus thurigiensis (Bt) cotton, a type of cotton introduced in India that requires fewer pesticides and can increase expected yields (see, among others, Qaim 2003; Qaim and Zilberman 2003; Kathage and Qaim 2012; Hubbell, Mara, and Carlson 2000; Klumper and Qaim 2014; Qiao 2015) .
Qualitative evidence points to the existence of a hierarchical learning structure in these villages, in which a few important farmers (following Rogers 1995, I will henceforth refer to them as "progressive farmers") are early adopters and are one of the primary sources of information about the new technology (see also Feder and Savastano 2006 on the role of leaders). In addition, there is reason to believe that social pressures are important in the adoption process because of the commonly-held (but erroneous) belief that the cultivation of Bt cotton, a GM crop, is harmful to animals (as well as to humans and the environment). This combination of social pressures and reliance on experimentation by progressive farmers appears to have given rise to rather diverse patterns of adoption in the sample villages.
Disentangling the effects of social learning and social pressures on adoption is important from a policy perspective, but encounters significant challenges in practice. Obtaining an accurate picture of an individual's social network from the information contained in a limited sample is not straightforward (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1995 simply take the village to be the relevant social group, although Bandiera and Rasul 2006 and Conley and Udry 2010 explicitly measure social networks), and existing methods of doing so are not without pitfalls. In particular, surveys that sample the social network without regard to hierarchical structure may misstate the nature of learning by failing to capture the central nodes in the diffusion process, which produces spurious correlations in the actions of farmers, which are then interpreted causally. Even if social networks are wellmeasured, there remains the thorny issue of inferring causal social interaction effects from correlations in individuals' behavior (see Manski 1993 for the identification challenges in a linear-in-means model). Constraints such as soil and climatic conditions, which can coordinate the actions of individuals, are rarely recorded in detail (Conley and Udry 2010 is a notable exception). Individual attributes such as risk aversion (also typically unobservable) can influence the network formation process, as well as adoption behavior. Finally, to the extent that different kinds of social interaction effects all result in correlations between individual and group behavior, it becomes difficult to disentangle their separate influences.
The data collection was specifically geared to address these empirical challenges. I elicited detailed information on farmer networks, distinguishing between the learning network, defined as those network neighbors of the farmer whose choice of technology (in this case, the cultivar), inputs, and outputs are known to the farmer, and the non-learning network, defined as network neighbors for whom the farmer only knows the choice of technology. I also ensured that links to progressive farmers were elicited for each farmer. A second unique feature of the data collection was the elicitation of farmers' current beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt and non-Bt cotton. Third, I elicited farmers' perceptions of the biosafety of Bt cotton, as well as their perception of the concerns of others in the village. Last but not least, I collected plot-, household, and village-level information, resulting in a detailed dataset on the agro-climate, agricultural production, prices, income, risk attitudes, and wealth in order to control for potentially confounding (non-social) factors that might correlate farmers' actions.
The direct elicitation of beliefs and the detailed network information are key innovations of the data collection that allow me to distinguish the channels of social interaction. I examine how a farmer's adoption decision is affected by the adoption decisions of other farmers in his network. Conditional on the farmer's beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton, the adoption decisions of others do not signal any new information about the technology; instead, their decisions matter only because of strategic considerations. These considerations relate to the possibility of strategically delaying (and free-riding) on others' future experimentation, and to the strength of social pressures (because social pressures are likely related to the overall rate of adoption of the new technology). I distinguish between these two effects empirically by relying on the distinction between learning and non-learning networks: strategically delaying behavior should only be a response to the adoption plans of those in the farmer's learning network, whereas the strength of social pressures plausibly depends on the adoption behavior of all (network) farmers. I supplement this analysis with an analysis that uses adoption histories over a sevenyear period preceding the survey, to examine how a farmer's adoption decision at a point in time relates to the current adoption decisions and adoption histories of other farmers.
The results provide a nuanced picture. First, (conditional on their beliefs about the technology) farmers were more likely to adopt Bt cotton if there were many others in the village also doing so, indicating the presence of social pressures. There is also clear evidence of social learning, but not all sources of information are equal. Specifically, I find evidence of farmers freeriding on the experimentation of the progressive farmers, delaying their adoption when they know more progressive farmers who are currently adopting. However, there is little evidence that farmers learn from the experimentation of non-progressive farmers. This finding is significant because local information (i.e., information derived from one's immediate neighbors) is an important factor that can support the spread of a beneficial action, and can counteract the effects of bad information derived from central sources (Bala and Goyal 1998; Goyal 2005) . The lack of importance given to local information (at least in these villages) therefore has the potential to exacerbate the learning externalities generated by the experiences of a few key farmers in the village, giving the latter an outsized influence on the overall rate of adoption.
Bt Cotton in India
Cotton is one of the main cash crops in India. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, cotton yields in India were low, averaging only onethird of China's yield (USDA 2016). Losses in cotton production were attributed to its predominant rain-fed cultivation and susceptibility to insects, pests, and diseases (and in particular bollworms). Since its introduction in India, the Bt technology has been surrounded by controversy and debate largely centered around the biosafety of genetically modified crops. These biosafety concerns may lead to social pressures that inhibit the adoption of Bt cotton (especially in the early years of the technology), that is, a farmer might be accused of endangering the health of animals and people in the village, as well as generating negative impacts on the soil fertility and water quality of neighboring plots. The scientific evidence available to date has shown that Bt cotton poses no significant risk to the environment or human and (vertebrate) animal health (see, among others, Shelton, Zhao, and Roush 2002; Mendelsohn et al. 2005) . In effect, both the environment and human health are likely to benefit from reduced pesticide use (Kouser and Qaim 2011; Abedullah, Kouser, and Qaim 2015) . The longer-term landscape-level effects on non-target organisms, and the degree of pest resistance, however, continue to be subject to study (Marvier et al. 2007; Lu et al. 2010 Lu et al. , 2012 Tabashnik, Bré vault, and Carrière 2013) .
In terms of yields and profits, Kathage and Qaim (2012) , using panel data collected between 2002 and 2008 among 533 farm households in central and southern India, conclude that Bt cotton has caused a 24% increase in cotton yield per acre and a 50% increase in profits among smallholders. Agricultural field trials confirm this conclusion: Qaim and Zilberman (2003) analyze trials from 2001-2002 (a high bollworm pressure year) on Bt cotton and its isogenic non-Bt counterpart and find that, independent of soil and climatic conditions, profits from Bt cotton are higher than profits from non-Bt cotton. 4 In the three villages I consider in this paper, Aurepalle in the Mahbubnagar district in Andhra Pradesh, and Kanzara and Kinkhed in the Akola district in Maharashtra, profits from Bt cotton are higher than profits from non-Bt cotton, irrespective of bollworm pressure, soil, and climatic conditions during 2006-2008 (see the online supplementary appendix).
Conceptual Framework
I first formalize the determinants of adoption. Denote by y i;t the cultivation decision of farmer i: Thus, y i;t ¼ 1 if farmer i plans to cultivate Bt cotton in period t, and y i;t ¼ 0 if the farmer plans to cultivate non-Bt cotton. I model y i;t as a function of farmer i's beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton, his expectations about the actions of other farmers, and his perception of others' and biosafety safety concerns regarding Bt cotton: ð1Þ y i;t ¼ f ðX it ; s Ài;t ; s it ; y e Ài;t ; X it Þ where X it denotes farmer i's beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton, s it denotes his own biosafety concerns, and s Ài;t denotes his perception of the biosafety concerns of others. Further, y e Ài;t is a vector that denotes (farmer i's belief about) the cultivation decisions of other farmers, and X it denotes a vector of characteristics of farmer i at time t. The latter includes the farmer's risk-aversion, credit constraints, and prices. I now discuss each of the first four elements in turn. 2 The Bt cultivars contain a gene sourced from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, which produces a protein that is toxic to bollworms, but provides no protection against other pests and diseases. When a Bt gene is inserted in the DNA of a plant, it only affects its pest resistance, not its duration, drought resistance, or fiber length etc. These properties are determined by the genetic properties of the cultivar in which the gene is inserted. In effect, whether or not a farmer adopts Bt cotton is likely to depend on the availability of local cultivars with the Bt gene. Krishna, Qaim, and Zilberman (2014) note that, over time, "the availability of many local varieties helped farmers to preserve diversity even with full Bt adoption." See Choudhary and Gaur (2010) for an overview of the Bt cultivars on the Indian market.
3 These rates refer to the Bollgard-I variety of Monsanto. 4 However, if the bollworm pressure is low (and hence fewer pesticides are needed) and the price of the Bt seed is high, this result might not hold. Pemsl, Waibel, and Orphal (2004) , using farm data from non-isogenic Bt and non-Bt cultivars during 2002-03, a low bollworm pressure year, conclude that, irrespective of soil and climatic conditions, non-Bt cotton outperforms Bt cotton.
The farmer's beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton, X it , are shaped by his own priors, the information he has obtained from his own past experimentation, and the information obtained from others' experimentation. Indeed, by observing the outcome of the experimentation by farmers in his learning network, the farmer can update his beliefs about the profitability of the technology. However, the farmer may also revise his beliefs to take into account the fact that farmers in his nonlearning network have adopted the technology, even though he cannot observe their yields because their behavior constitutes a (noisy) signal about the profitability of the technology. For the same reason, contemporaneous adoption by other farmers is also incorporated in X it , even though the outcomes of these experiments are yet to be known. Lastly, an important feature of the perceived yield distribution X it is that it incorporates the technological constraints faced by farmer i, including soil conditions and water availability.
The farmer's beliefs about the biosafety of Bt cotton, denoted by s it ; as well as his perception about others' concerns about Bt cotton, denoted by s Ài;t ; also influence his adoption behavior. In particular, s Ài;t directly relates to social pressures: if (he thinks that) others are concerned about potential negative externalities from Bt cultivation, this may discourage the farmer from adopting it himself for fear of social sanctions. Both s it and s Ài;t may be shaped by the past and current adoption behavior of others in his network. For instance, current adoption by others in his network may signal to the farmer that the technology is safe, and may cause him to revise s it .
The fourth determinant of adoption, y e Ài;t , potentially arises from two considerations. The previous discussion implied that, conditional on X it , s it , s Ài;t , and X it , the contemporaneous adoption plans of others, y e Ài;t , do not contain any new information about the profitability of the technology or its biosafety. Indeed, all information about profitability is embedded in X it and X it , while one's own biosafety concerns are embedded in s it . There are, however, two reasons why y e Ài;t may nonetheless exert an independent influence on y i;t : (a) farmer i may choose to strategically delay and free-ride on the experimentation of the current adopters in his network, implying that an increase in expected adoption in the network would tend to reduce the probability that farmer i adopts, and (b) the influence of social pressures (deriving from other villagers' safety concerns about Bt cotton) may depend on the extent of adoption of Bt cotton. For instance, an individual Bt farmer is less likely to be blamed for any occurrences of human or animal illness in the area if he is only one among many Bt cultivators, implying that an increase in the expected number of adopters would tend to increase the probability that farmer i adopts. In the context of strategicallydelaying behavior, it is important to note that the farmer could only hope to learn from the experimentation of farmers whose yields he can observe, that is, those farmers who are in his learning network. In the case of social pressures, however, what matters is the total number of expected adopters, regardless of whether the adopters are in farmer i's learning network or in his non-learning network. This is a key distinction that will allow me to distinguish the effect of free-riding from that of social pressures. Specifically, adoption in the farmer's learning network should have a negative effect on his adoption probability relative to adoption in the non-learning network because the former activates the strategicallydelaying channel in addition to the social pressure channel.
Lastly, note that although the technological factors that determine yield and hence adoption, such as soil characteristics and irrigation, are assumed to be embedded in X it , the adoption decision is also likely to be influenced by factors such as the farmer's riskaversion, credit constraints, and prices that are included in the vector X it .
Data Collection
I use two sources of data for this study: data from an existing International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)-Village Level Studies (VLS) survey, and data from a survey I collected for the purpose of this study in the same villages. As part of its (VLS) program, ICRISAT annually surveys households in rural India (Bantilan et al. 2006; Rao and Charyulu 2007) . The VLS villages were selected in 1975 to represent (albeit not statistically) the semi-arid tropics in India (Walker and Ryan 1990 I elicited each farmer's cultivation decisions for the forthcoming cropping season 2008-2009 (elicited in the month that seeds had to be bought so as to accurately reflect planned cultivation choices), as well as recall information on past cotton production decisions covering the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . I also included questions on household composition, landholding, wealth, credit and irrigation constraints, risk preferences, and per-plot agricultural inputs and outputs (all pertaining to the time of survey). 5, 6 To analyze the role of social networks in the adoption process of Bt cotton, the survey included modules for measuring social networks and beliefs about the yield and biosafety of Bt cotton. These parts of the survey have some important elements that are described below.
Identifying Key Farmers
According to the village farmers' own account in a qualitative survey preceding the data collection, certain individuals in the village act as early adopters of new technologies, and appear to play a central role in the diffusion of information. I identified a set of "progressive farmers" based on group discussions with the junior VLS investigators who have been living in the village since 2001, the senior VLS investigators who have known the villagers since the beginning of the VLS survey in 1975, and village elderly. The pre-identification of the progressive farmers took place during a separate visit in between the qualitative data collection and the pilot testing of the questionnaire. During this conversation, I did not mention that the topic of the study was Bt cotton; instead, I spoke in general terms of technology leaders in the village. We then had a focus group discussion with 5-6 members in each village, as well as the live-in enumerators, using social network graph tools. Of the fortythree progressive farmers thus identified (twenty-eight in Aurepalle, six in Kanzara, and nine in Kinkhed), twenty-one were outside the ICRISAT-VLS sample. The data provides some confirmation that this initial identification of progressive farmers as technology leaders was valid: when asked "If you, today, would have a specific problem with your cotton crop, who or where would you go to (up to five answers allowed)?" 63%, 78%, and 85% of the responses in Kanzara, Kinkhed, and Aurepalle, respectively, matched a pre-identified progressive farmer.
Measuring Networks
I measured networks using the "randommatching-within-sample" technique, based on Conley and Udry (2001, 2010) and Santos and Barrett (2007) . Each respondent was matched with six randomly-drawn VLS respondents, as well as four pre-identified progressive farmers. I elicited the details of the relationship between the respondent and each match, particularly focusing on the knowledge that the respondent has about the match's farming activities in terms of inputs and outputs in the current season. A particular match is only considered to be in the farmer's network if the farmer knows (or, more precisely, thinks he knows) the match's choice of cultivar. In the analysis, I further distinguish between "learning" and "nonlearning" networks: a network contact is classified as being in farmer i 0 s learning network if farmer i knows (or more accurately, thinks he knows) the contact's cultivar choice, pesticide use, and yield, as knowledge of these would allow the farmer to infer the profitability of the technology being used by the contact. All other network members are classified as belonging to the farmer's nonlearning network, that is, this is the complementary network. I also distinguish between progressive and non-progressive networks, the former being defined as the set of progressive farmers who are in farmer i's network, and the latter consisting of all other farmers in his network.
In addition to learning from each other, farmers might receive information through (typically unannounced) visits of company agents to the village and conversations with the input dealers in the nearest urban hub. To capture these interactions, I added a module on the information obtained since 2001 from contacts with extension agents, Nongovernmental organizations, company agents, input dealers, and ICRISAT.
Measuring Yield Beliefs
I elicited information on current beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt and non-Bt cotton and the biosafety hazards associated with Bt cotton. I used an exercise based on Lybbert and Just (2007) , in which respondents were asked to construct yield distributions for Bt and non-Bt cotton-I refer to these yield distributions as yield beliefs (Delavande 2010 and . 
Measuring Biosafety Concerns
To elicit the respondent's biosafety concerns, I asked the respondent to what degree he/she thought that Bt cotton is hazardous for (a) animal health, (b) for human health, and (c) for the environment. 8 As the qualitative survey preceding the data collection revealed that perceived biosafety concerns of others may also exert an effect on adoption behavior, I then repeated this question but this time referred to the beliefs of "others in the village."
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the composition of cotton farmers in the three study villages, differentiating between progressive and non-progressive farmers. To maintain a consistent sample, this section reports descriptive statistics on the 130 cotton farmers used in the cross-sectional analysis pertaining to the 2008-2009 season. On average, the progressive farmers are more educated and own more land, of which a larger share is irrigated. It is also worth noting that there are large differences in the level of education between Aurepalle and the two villages in Maharashtra, Kanzara and Kinkhed. Table 2 summarizes farmers' biosafety concerns (in 2008), averaging over the three types of concerns (relating to animal health, human health, and the environment, respectively). Biosafety concerns differ between the study villages, with Aurepalle respondents being less concerned than farmers in Kanzara and Kinkhed. To further understand which elements of safety the farmers were concerned about, I plot the percentage distribution of responses to the three types of questions in figure 1 in the online supplementary appendix. As the figure shows, concerns related to the biosafety of Bt cotton are generally very low in Aurepalle, but more widespread in Kanzara and Kinkhed, especially with regard to environment-related concerns. Table 3 summarizes the yield beliefs (in 2008) for each of the Bt and non-Bt cultivars that the farmer was asked about. All respondents attributed a uni-modal yield distribution to all cultivars, and even though I reject normality for the sample as a whole (the yield distributions are, on average, leftskewed and platykurtic), they are close to normality. On average, Bt cotton cultivars are thought to have a higher expected yield than non-Bt cotton cultivars. In addition, progressive farmers expect a higher yield from Bt cotton than non-progressive farmers, although the difference in expected 7 I first elicited the minimum and maximum yield (per acre) of two Bt and non-Bt cultivars of the respondent's choice conditional on the respondent's soil characteristics, irrigation status, and expected input use. Then I made five boxes, evenly distributed between this minimum and maximum, and I asked the respondent to use twenty stones (each stone representing a 5% probability) to form a yield density function. After each yield distribution game, I asked the respondent how much he expects to pay (a) for the seed (per acre), and (b) for pesticides and for other inputs (per acre). The respondents understood the yield distribution game very well, as it was narrated in a way farmers in these regions think about their yields, making reference to the weather variability and pest pressure variability. In the analysis, I average the information of both Bt (non-Bt) cultivars.
8 Specifically, the questions read "Bt cotton is hazardous for animal health: They might get sick or die when they eat the fodder"; "Bt cotton is hazardous for human health: If you touch it too much, you might get sick"; and "Bt cotton is hazardous for the environment: It damages other crops and soils." Note that no explicit reference is made to reduced pesticide use and the potential effects of this on health and the environment. Each of these three questions has five possible answers, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" and a "don't know" option.
yield is only statistically significant for the first cultivar elicited (which is also most likely to be the cultivar that the farmer is most knowledgeable about). To compare these beliefs with actual yield realizations, table 4 shows the average yields associated with Bt and non-Bt cotton from [2006] [2007] for the two groups of farmers. 9 With the caveat that these yield data (part of the Notes: The table summarizes the socio-economic characteristics of the cotton farmers in the study sample in each of the three study villages, distinguishing between progressive (PF) and non-progressive (non-PF) farmers. 1 This is a binary response to the question of whether the farmer would consider obtaining credit to purchase inputs (yes¼1; no ¼ 0). 2 Subjective risk assessment corresponds to the answer to the question: "Compared to others, do you think that you take: Much less risks (i); Somewhat less risks (ii); About the same risks (iii); Somewhat more risks (iv); Much more risks (v)?" Standard deviations are in parentheses. The last column reports differences between progressive and non-progressive farmers in the full sample, along with associated standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks denote statistical significance of these differences, based on t-tests. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Notes: The table summarizes the beliefs of the cotton farmers in the sample with respect to the biosafety of Bt cotton. "Biosafety concern of self (others)" is the average of the answers to "To what degree do you yourself think (think other villagers think) that Bt cotton is hazardous for (1) animal health, (2) human health and (3) the environment?" The responses to this question are categorical, and range from 1 to 5, with higher values referring to an increased concern with biosafety issues. Standard deviations in parentheses. The last column reports the differences between progressive and non-progressive farmers in the full sample, along with associated standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks denote statistical significance of these differences, based on t-tests. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
existing ICRISAT-VLS survey) are of poor quality, due to conversion issues with mixed cropping arrangements, we observe that progressive farmers appear to have obtained significantly greater yields per acre when cultivating Bt cotton than non-progressive farmers, although the differences in yield associated with non-Bt cotton are small and insignificant. In addition, the average Bt cotton yields exceed the average non-Bt yields across the board (this is consistent with Abedullah, Kouser, and Qaim 2015 and Qaim and Zilberman 2012) . To examine how yield beliefs relate to actual yields, I conduct a simple regression analysis (table 5) , regressing expected Bt cotton yield on farmer characteristics and past adoption and yield. As the results show, access to irrigation results in higher expected yield. There is also some evidence that educated farmers have lower yield expectations, suggesting that they may be less likely to overestimate the yield, while progressive farmers expect slightly higher yield. Once we control for prior adoption, the effects of these farmer characteristics shrink and become insignificant. It is reassuring to note that the prior adoption dummy has a large positive and statistically significant effect on expected yield. I also find that expected yields correlate strongly with actual yield and profits in 2006-2007 (the sample is now restricted to those farmers who cultivated Bt in 2006-2007, despite the fact that these variables are quite noisy). Table 6 presents some descriptive statistics from the random-matching-within-sample method. Recall that each respondent drew six name cards of VLS respondents and was given a set of four fixed cards with names of progressive farmers. Farmers in Aurepalle, Kanzara, and Kinkhed think they know the cultivar of 44%, 57%, and 68%, respectively, of the ten other farmers whose names they were shown. However, farmers (think they) know the choice of inputs and output for a smaller set of individuals in the village, especially in Aurepalle and Kanzara, that is, the learning network is, as is to be expected, smaller than the non-learning network. The learning network in Aurepalle, Kanzara, and Kinkhed corresponds to, respectively, 17%, Notes: The table summarizes the beliefs of the cotton farmers in the sample with respect to the yield of Bt and non-Bt cotton (beliefs were elicited for two cultivars of Bt and non-Bt cotton, respectively), calculated assuming a step-wise distribution with the minimum and maximum of the distribution as specified by the respondent (1 quintal¼100kg). Standard deviations in parentheses. The last column reports the differences between progressive and non-progressive farmers in the full sample, along with associated standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks denote statistical significance of these differences, based on ttests. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
22%, and 55% of the ten cards drawn. Some of these differences could be attributed to differences in village size: one can see that in a small village like Kinkhed, farmers appear to be informed about the activities and experiences of most other farmers in the village, but this is less so in a large village like Aurepalle. Maertens and Barrett (2013) used these data to estimate a dyadic regression to establish the correlates of learning links. These authors find that belonging to the same sub-caste is associated with an increased Standard deviations are in parentheses. The last column reports the difference in average yield between progressive and non-progressive farmers in the full sample, along with associated standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks denote statistical significance of these differences, based on t-tests. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
The table presents regressions of the expected yield of Bt cotton on farmer characteristics and prior experience with Bt cotton cultivation. In columns 1-4, the expected yield refers to the first cultivar of Bt cotton that the farmer provided beliefs for, while columns 5-8 refer to the expected yield for the second cultivar. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
likelihood of a learning link. Location matters as well: living near another farmer, having a field near another farmer's field, or merely passing by another farmer's field on a regular basis all increase the likelihood of a learning link. The difference between the farmer and his link's education, land acreage, or age does not appear to be statistically significantly correlated with the probability of a learning link.
Bt Cotton Adoption in the Study Villages: A Descriptive Account
To set the stage for the formal analysis, I briefly describe the adoption process in the study villages, drawing on the quantitative and qualitative parts of the survey. Figure 1 graphs the adoption rate of Bt cotton over time, separately for each of the three villages, and distinguishes between adoption by progressive and non-progressive farmers. 10 A common theme that emerged from the qualitative interviews was the central role played by progressive farmers as first adopters and sources of information about the technology. As figure 1 shows, in all three study villages, progressive farmers appear to adopt earlier than nonprogressive farmers, and are (at time of survey) more likely to be cultivating Bt cotton.
There are also evident differences in the timing and rate of adoption between the study villages. This is partly due to the fact that in Andhra Pradesh, the state in which Aurepalle is situated, one out of three of the Bt cotton cultivars was not on the market during the first two cropping seasons . In addition, during the first three years, NGOs and the Andhra Pradesh government challenged the decision of the GEAC with regard to the approval of Bt cotton, resulting in a discontinuation of the permission for commercial cultivation of several Notes: The table shows the size of the average individual's network, differentiating between progressive and non-progressive farmers in the network, and between learning and non-learning networks. Network sizes are based on a random-matching-within-sample exercise, in which each respondent was asked about his relationship with and information about (i) 4 progressive farmers, and (ii) 6 non-progressive farmers in the village. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Bt adoption process has been smooth, characterized by partial adoption, strategic delays, and dis-adoption. The dis-adoption rate of Bt cotton is between 14% and 27% each year, and the percentage of Bt farmers who are partial adopters ranges from 31% to 80%. What explains these different adoption approaches? First, there are the usual constraints: credit, land, and irrigation, which are different across villages. Kanzara and Aurepalle farmers have a higher rate of access to credit from input dealers compared to Kinkhed, which might have allowed them to start the adoption process when the price of Bt cotton was still high. Differences in landholding are also important because, although the seed is inherently a scale-neutral technology, the fact that the seed needs to be bought Note: The panels above show the adoption rate of Bt cotton over time for each of the three study villages, separately for progressive (PF) and non-progressive (non-PF) farmers. These rates are based on retrospective information on adoption provided by the respondents and include all progressive farmers in the survey sample (including those who were not in the original ICRISAT-VLS sample). The difference between progressive and non-progressive farmer rates of adoption is statistically significant at the 5% level ( in bags of one acre implies that farmers who own more land have more scope for experimentation. Irrigation is another important factor: Aurepalle farmers are exposed to a more drought-prone climate but typically have access to groundwater irrigation during the rainy season, while Kanzara and Kinkhed farmers, who use surface water, do not. As groundwater is typically a more reliable source of irrigation than surface water and cotton is sensitive to a lack of water, the latter might be more reluctant to switch to a high-input high-output technology.
In addition, differences in informational constraints are likely to play an important role. For instance, differences in access to the media-17% of Aurepalle farmers claim to have heard about Bt cotton from the media, versus 5% in Kanzara, and 7% in Kinkhed (these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level between states)-and differences in access to input dealers and company agents result not only in different beliefs with regard to the profitability of Bt cotton but also different beliefs with regard to its biosafety. But not all sources of information are external to the village. The experimentation and experiences of others in the village constitutes a potentially important source of information about the technology. The extent to which farmers are connected to and can learn from the experiences of other farmers is quite variable. For instance, the average Aurepalle farmer, by sheer virtue of living in a larger village, might appear to have more opportunities to learn by observing other farmers' experimentation. However, as he only knows a small share of these villagers very well, that is, by cultivar, yield, and pesticide use, he is less likely to learn something useful from the Bt cotton farmers he knows. Further, the ability to learn from others' experimentation is limited by social pressures arising from biosafety concerns, which reduce the total information available about the technology by inhibiting its adoption by others. Last but not least, an important theme that emerged in the qualitative interviews was the central role played by progressive farmers as first adopters and sources of information about the technology. This clearly has the potential to generate significant variation in adoption across the study villages, given the differences in rates of progressive farmer adoption of Bt cotton across these villages. Understanding these social interaction effects is the main objective of this paper.
Analysis and Results
I first explore the data on adoption over the 2001-2007 period. I relate each farmer's adoption decision at each point in time to the current and past adoption decisions of farmers in his network. Past adoption in the network potentially matters for the farmer's current adoption decision because it shapes the farmer's current beliefs about the profitability of the new technology. Current adoption in the network may matter because it (in addition) might trigger strategic delays and/ or moderate social pressures that inhibit adoption. Because the farmers' elicited beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton correspond only to the time of survey (i.e., 2008), I cannot control for beliefs in this part of the analysis.
I first estimate the following probit model:
where n i;t denotes the expected number of adopters of Bt cotton in farmer i's network (based on the random-matching-within-sample) in the current period (i.e., n i;t ¼ P Ài y Ài;t Þ, n i;Àt denotes the number of times that Bt cotton has been cultivated in farmer i's network in all past periods leading up to t (i.e., n i;Àt ¼ P Ài P tÀ1 s¼1 y Ài;s Þ, g t denotes a year fixed effect, and X i;t includes the remainder of the variables that are known to affect technology adoption, such as information received from non-farmer sources (e.g., seed dealers), the farmer's subjective risk assessment, education level of the decision maker, assets, credit constraints, soil fertility and irrigation constraints, prices, and village fixed effects. This wide range of controls, many of which are usually unobservable, limits potential omitted variable bias, including the bias associated with network formation along certain household and individual characteristics. The regression sample retains each farmer only up to his first adoption of Bt cotton.
11 In this specification, the coefficient b reflects the effect of total contemporaneous adoption in farmer i's network, while c captures the effect of cumulative past adoption in the network.
Recognizing the limitation in interpreting c (see discussion below), I particularly focus on b, whose sign is theoretically ambiguous. This is because current adoption in the network exerts a positive effect on farmer i as social pressures decline with increasing adoption, Notes: The table presents the average marginal effects corresponding to probit regressions, in which the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the farmer cultivated Bt cotton in a particular year. The regression sample retains each farmer up to the point of his first adoption. The bottom panel presents the estimated differences between coefficients on adoption in the learning and non-learning networks, along with the estimated standard error in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for information received from non-farmer sources (e.g., seed dealers), the farmer's subjective risk assessment, education level of the decision maker, assets, credit constraints, soil fertility and irrigation constraints, prices, village, and year fixed effects. The full set of regression coefficients is reported in the supplemental appendix online.
but at the same time exerts a negative effect to the extent that the farmer could free-ride on the experimentation of others in his network.
Column 1 of table 7 presents the average marginal effects from regression (2). Contemporaneous adoption in the network increases the probability of adoption by farmer i (each extra adopter in the network increases farmer i's probability of adoption by 0.1 percentage points). Next, I refine the specification by distinguishing between adoption in farmer i's progressive and nonprogressive networks. The results are reported in column 2 of table 7 (where the superscripts PF and nPF denote progressive and non-progressive farmer networks, respectively). We now observe a sharp distinction between the effect of contemporaneous adoption by progressive and non-progressive farmers. Increased adoption in the current period by progressive farmers reduces the probability that farmer i adopts, whereas increased adoption by non-progressive farmers increases his probability of adoption. This dichotomy is consistent with the idea that farmers strategically delay adoption to observe the experimentation of progressive farmers, whereas contemporaneous adoption by non-progressive farmers works mainly through the social pressure channel, and therefore exerts a positive effect on adoption.
Next, I distinguish between adoption in learning and non-learning networks. We expect that strategic delay should only occur on current adoption behavior in the learning network, while adoption behavior of nonlearning network members should affect farmer i's decision positively through the social pressure channel, implying that b L should be less than b nL . This hypothesis is supported by the results in column 3 (where superscripts L and nL denote learning and non-learning networks, respectively), which indicate that b L À b nL is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level: the strategic delay effect implies that an extra adopter in the learning network reduces the farmer's probability of adoption by 0.1 percentage points (the difference b L À b nL reported at the bottom of table 7).
Finally, I consider the most detailed specification, which distinguishes between both progressive and non-progressive networks, as well as between learning and non-learning networks. The results are reported in column 4 of table 7. We see that within the progressive farmer network, adoption in the learning network has a negative effect relative to adoption in the non-learning network, that is, b PF;L À b PF;nL < 0, which is consistent with farmers delaying adoption and freeriding on the experimentation of progressive farmers in their learning network. The freeriding effect is larger than that obtained in the specification in column (3), where we did not distinguish between progressive and nonprogressive farmers: an extra adopter in the progressive-farmer learning network reduces the farmer's probability of adoption by 0.9 percentage points (the difference b PF;L Àb PF;nL reported at the bottom of table 7) . Interestingly, however, we do not find a similar effect when we look at adoption within the non-progressive farmer network. Indeed, adoption in both the learning and nonlearning networks has a positive effect, with the difference b nPF;L À b nPF;nL being small and not significantly different from zero, suggesting that experimentation by nonprogressive farmers is not an important source of learning about the technology and therefore does not give rise to strategic delays.
Although the results are suggestive, the methodology above has some important limitations. First, cumulative past adoption in the network is at best a weak proxy for the farmer's current belief about Bt cotton because the former does not account for either the actual outcomes of experimentation or the farmer's initial beliefs about the technology. Thus, the outcomes of some experiments may have made the farmer more optimistic about the technology, while the outcomes of others may have made him less so, implying that the coefficients on the past adoption variables are theoretically ambiguous. Second, contemporaneous adoption in the network may be signaling something to the farmer about the profitability of the technology, in addition to influencing his behavior through the freeriding and social-pressure channels-this muddies the interpretation of the b coefficients above.
Both these limitations can be addressed by directly controlling for the farmer's actual beliefs about the yield of Bt cotton. To do so, I now turn to the main analysis, which examines the adoption decisions of farmers in 2008, the point in time at which beliefs about yield were elicited.
Analysis of Adoption Decisions in 2008
Because the analysis now pertains to the planting decision at a single point in time, I drop the t subscripts. I start with the following probit specification:
where I have slightly abused notation to denote by X i the vector of first and second moments of the farmer's belief distribution. The specification differs from that in equation (2) in the inclusion of the controls for the farmer's beliefs about the yield of Bt and non-Bt cotton and the biosafety concerns of other villagers, denoted by s Ài . The vector X i now includes input and output prices, the farmer's subjective risk assessment, credit constraints, expected number of pesticide sprays, own biosafety concerns s i (which may be affected by the number of current adopters in one's network), and village fixed effects.
12 Table 8 reports the estimated average marginal effects. As before, I estimate the specification in equation (3), and then refine the network variables further, first differentiating between progressive and non-progressive networks, then differentiating between learning and non-learning networks, and finally considering the most detailed specification.
Adoption in the full network has a statistically significant and positive effect on farmer i's probability of adoption (column 1), indicating that, on average, the social pressure channel dominates any strategic delays. Notes: The table presents average marginal effects corresponding to probit regressions, in which the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the farmer had decided to cultivate Bt cotton in the 2008 cultivation period. The bottom panel presents the estimated differences between coefficients on adoption in the learning and non-learning networks, along with the estimated standard error in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for input and output prices, the farmer's subjective risk assessment, credit constraints, expected number of pesticide sprays, own and others' bio-safety concerns, and village fixed effects.The full set of regression coefficients is reported in the supplemental appendix online.
However, this overall effect disguises the fact that adoption in the progressive network reduces farmer i's probability of adoption by 6.4 percentage points, whereas adoption in the non-progressive network increases the probability of adoption by 0.3 percentage points (column 2), suggesting that free-riding behavior is indeed activated but only by adoption in the progressive network. Distinguishing between learning and nonlearning networks (column 3), we find that adoption in the former does indeed reduce farmer i's probability of adoption by 4.1 percentage points, consistent with strategic delays, while adoption in the non-learning network increases the adoption probability of the farmer by 0.4 percentage points, consistent with the social pressure channel. As expected, the difference b L À b nL is negative and statistically significant: the implied strategic delay is that an extra adopter in the learning network reduces the probability of adoption by 4.5 percentage points. Finally, the results from the detailed specification confirm that free-riding behavior is activated by adoption in the progressive learning network, as evidenced by the fact that b PF;L À b PF;nL is negative and statistically significant, but there is little evidence of free-riding on the experimentation of non-progressive farmers, as evidenced by the fact that b nPF;L À b nPF;nL is not significantly different from zero. Overall, these results are qualitatively consistent with those obtained in the previous section (table 7) . Notably, however, the point estimates in table 8 indicate significantly larger free-riding effects than those obtained in table 7. In particular, an extra adopter in the progressive farmer learning network implies a reduction in the probability of adoption by 30 percentage points. While this is an admittedly large effect, the associated confidence interval implies that the effect may be as small as 8.7 percentage points. It might also be useful to recall that the number of progressive farmers in each village are small compared to the population as a whole. For instance, in Aurepalle, there are twentyeight progressive farmers out of a population of 925 households, and farmers, on average, have a 0.3 probability of having a learning link with a given progressive farmer.
In the online supplementary appendix, I present two extensions addressing concerns of endogenous group formation (farmers who are particularly interested in Bt cotton may seek out and form informational links with farmers who plan to cultivate Bt cotton) and simultaneity of actions (of which both strategic delay and social pressures are examples). I find that the results in this section are robust to these extensions.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper takes a closer look at the role of social networks in technology adoption, in the context of the adoption of Bt cotton, a type of (genetically engineered) cotton that has been available on the Indian market since 2002. To do so, I collected a unique dataset on cotton farmers in three villages in India.
The article makes two contributions. First, I show that social learning appears to have a hierarchical nature, in the sense that farmers in the study villages tend to learn from the experimentation of a select group of progressive farmers, but not from the experimentation of ordinary network neighbors. That is, even though for most farmers, the conditions in which they operate (in terms of soil and irrigation) might be quite different from the conditions under which the progressive farmers work, they are still more likely to learn from these progressive farmers' experiences than from each others' experiences. This is a surprising finding that adds significant nuance to our understanding of social learning in rural settings. The policy implications of this finding are also surprising: given that progressive farmers are central information sources, it might be natural to assume that they should be preferentially targeted with subsidies. In fact, however, the intuition of Bala and Goyal (1998) suggests that in some instances, it might not be a good idea to target progressive farmers: if the technology's performance is variable, then the network structure of who-learns-from-who becomes important. If (as appears to be the case in the study villages) most people learn from observing the experiences of a few influential farmers, then there is an equilibrium in which eventually no one adopts the technology (this occurs if the experimentation by the progressive farmers turns up some bad experiences). In this situation, it may actually make sense to target (perhaps smaller) subsidies to a larger set of individual farmers so as to reduce their reliance on the experimentation of progressive farmers. Note, however, that-while this scenario is possible-this is not what happened in India. Overall, Bt cotton was a success in India. By the mid 2000s, the allIndia adoption rate stood at 80% (as percentage of cotton farmers; see Chaudhary and Gaur 2010) . By 2015, 93% of the cotton area was under Bt cotton cultivation (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation 2015).
Second, GM crops are often associated (rightly or wrongly) with adverse health and environmental effects. The case of Bt cotton is particularly interesting because farmers in rural India-at the time of the survey in 2008-appeared to have concerns about the effects of the crop on livestock and the environment. Both qualitative as well as quantitative analyses indicate that biosafety concerns are an important determinant of adoption in the study villages. While these concerns might decrease adoption, they also give rise to social pressures that inhibit adoption, and as a result, reduce the total information generated about the technology. From a policy perspective, if social pressures are significant, providing information to a few selected farmers is unlikely to result in wide-scale adoption. Instead, a group-based approach should be used in which farmers can discuss their concerns about the technology and learn about the (lack of) concerns of others. However, because social pressures in this setting relate to the GM nature of the technology, the results of this study cannot be readily extended to other technologies (even though they might be of use to gain an understanding of the adoption process of new GM crops that India and other developing countries plan to introduce, such as Bt eggplant). Nevertheless, the method proposed could be adapted to study other technologies (e.g., health technologies), where social norms and pressures are suspected to matter.
To conclude, recognizing limited external validity using a sample of three villages, I find that farmers in these villages appeared to learn exclusively from the experimentation of a small set of progressive farmers in the village. Second, I find evidence of social pressures, originating from the belief that Bt cotton might be hazardous to the environment and livestock, which inhibited adoption.
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